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1.1 BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
One of the purposes of the Labour Relations Act1 is o promote the effective resolution of 
disputes.2 The LRA gives the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration3 the 
power to resolve disputes through arbitration.4 An arbitration award issued by the commissioner 
is final and binding.5 Although arbitration awards are binding, the LRA affords parties who 
allege a defect in any arbitration proceedings under the auspices of the commission the right to 
apply to the Labour Court for an order setting aside the arbitration award.6 The parties to a 
dispute have a right to review arbitration awards on the grounds listed in section 145 of the LRA. 
The Constitutional Court in Sidumo v Rustenburg platinum Ltd & others7 however held that the 
requirement of reasonableness must be suffused into the statutory review grounds, thereby 
adding a further ground of review to the statutory grounds of review [the ‘Sidumo’ test].  
 
Reviews include arbitration awards issued by the bargaining councils. In terms of section 51(3) 
of the LRA, if a dispute is referred to an accredit bargaining council in terms of the LRA, the 
council must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation and if the dispute remains 
unresolved the council must arbitrate the dispute if the LRA requires arbitration. In terms of 
section 51(8) all provisions in the LRA relating to the conduct of arbitrations, including sections 
142A, 143, 144, 145 and 146 apply to any arbitration conducted under th auspices of a 
bargaining council. Thus where disputes are referred for conciliation and arbitration in terms of 
the LRA to accredited bargaining councils, the bargaining council arbitrators have the same 
functions, powers, duties and review evaluation that CCMA commissioners have when 
                                                          
1
 66 of 1995. Hereafter referred to as the LRA. 
2
 Section 1(d)(iv). 
3
 Hereafter referred to as the CCMA 
4
 Section 136. 
5
 Section 143(1) of Labour relations Act 66 of 1995.  
6
 Section 145. 
7
(2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC). 
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conciliating and arbitrating disputes. Thus all discu sions on reviews relate to arbitrations 
conducted by bargaining councils under the LRA.       
 
There has been a debate both in the Labour Courts and Constitutional Court regarding the 
interpretation and scope for review provided by section 145 of the LRA and further whether the 
constitutional right to fair and reasonable administrative decisions has added a ground for review 
to section 145. This has generated numerous conflicti g judgments and essentially an imprecise 
jurisprudence on the matter. This in turn has, for years, generated a lot of debate in academic 
articles and journals. The debate in essence has revolved around whether section 145 provides 
for both a result-based and process-related review and whether the review ground of 
reasonableness introduced by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo restricted the review to a result-
based approach, namely that if the outcome can be justified on the record, it does not matter how 
the commissioner arrived at his or her decision. That is, the Sidumo test has done away with the 
process-related review. The Labour Appeal Court8 decision of Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd9 was 
considered, by most of the prolific commentators on this matter, to have put an end to this 
debate. However the LAC’s findings were recently set aside by the Supreme Court of Appeal10 
in Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (COSATU AS AMICUS CURIAE).11 After visiting the debate 
surrounding the proper test for reviews of such arbitration proceedings raised in the LAC 
judgment, the SCA found that the LAC and the cases relied upon by the LAC had unduly relaxed 
the grounds for challenging arbitrations conducted in terms of the LRA and then re-affirmed the 
correct test for such reviews.     
 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to analyse the review of arbitration proceedings 
conducted under the LRA.  
The following questions are addressed: 
                                                          
8
 Hereafter referred to as the LAC. 
9
 (2012) 33 ILJ 1789 (LAC). 
10
 Hereafter referred to as the SCA. 
11




1. What is the difference between a review and an appeal? 
2. What are the grounds for review in terms of section 145 of the LRA?  How do they operate? 
3. How have the courts formulated and developed the test for review?   
4. What is the role of reasonableness in the review of CCMA arbitration proceedings? 
5. Whether the SCA in Herholdt has finally settled the debate surrounding the proper test for 
reviews of arbitration proceedings conducted under th  LRA. 
 
1.3. AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
One of the purposes of this research is to show that for many years the Labour Courts failed to 
settle on clear and consistent jurisprudence regarding the test for review permitted by section 145 
of the LRA and the interpretation and application of the so-called ‘Sidumo’ test for review. A 
further aim of this paper is to determine whether t SCA in Herholdt has finally settled these 
debates. 
 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology that this research employed is desktop research. Primary and secondary 
sources of law such as journal articles, case law, textbooks, and legislation were used to analyse 









CHAPTER TWO  
REVIEWS AND APPEALS DISTINGUISHED 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The question that often arises is whether a party wishing to have the judgment of a lower court 
set aside should proceed by way of appeal or review. The grounds of complaint will determine 
which procedure a party should follow. When conducting an appeal, the court is obliged to 
consider the merits of the matter before it and determine whether the decision of the lower court 
was correct.12 When hearing a review the court may not entertain the merits of the decision, but 
is instead required to determine whether the manner i  which the arbitrator conducted the 
proceedings was appropriate.13 Since the statutory grounds of review have become suffused by 
the constitutional standard of reasonableness, it would seem that the distinction between appeals 
and reviews have become blurred because they now have to examine both the manner in which 
the decision was reached and the merits of the matter (the decision itself must be reasonable). 
However, the Labour Courts have also stressed the importance of maintaining the distinction.  
 
2.2 GENERAL DISTINCTION 
At the most general level the distinction between rview and appeal may be explained as 
follows: An appeal court considers the material that w s before the court of first instance to reach 
its own conclusion on that evidence and material; a review focuses on the decision making 
process (how the relevant decisions were arrived at). Wade and Forsyth14 described the 
difference as follows:  
“The system of judicial review is radically different from the system of appeals when 
hearing an appeal the court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. 
When subjecting some administrative act or order to judicial review, the court is concerned 
with its legality. On an appeal the question is ‘right or wrong’? On review the question is 
‘lawful or unlawful’?”15 
                                                          
12
 E Fergus ‘The Distinction Between Appeals and Reviews- Defining the Limits of the Labour Courts Power of 




 W Wade & C Forsyth Adminstrative Law  7 ed (1994). 
15




In Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council16the court stated 
the following: 
“The procedure for review differs in several respects from the procedure by way of appeal, 
for example, an appellant comes into court upon a record of the case in the court below, 
and by that record he is bound; he cannot take advantage of any circumstances which does 
not appear upon or cannot be deducted from the record. On the other hand, the litigant who 
seeks to have a case reviewed depends upon irregulaities which need not necessarily 
appear upon the face of the record. If they do not so appear, he is at liberty by affidavit to 
bring the facts upon which he relies to the notice of the Supreme Court. He is not bound by 
the record in the way in which an appellant is.”17   
 
The court went on to describe a review as “the process by which the proceedings of inferior 
courts of justice, both civil and criminal are brought before this court in respect of grave 
irregularities or illegalities occurring during the course of such proceedings.”18 
 
The court identified three types of review, namely: 
“Firstly, review by summons being review of proceedings of inferior courts (civil or 
criminal) in respect of grave irregularities or illegalities occurring during the course of such 
proceedings; secondly, review by motion being review of the performance of statutory 
duties imposed on a public body; and thirdly a wider power specially given under particular 
statutes enabling the review court to exercise the powers of a court of appeal or review or 
even of a court of first instance.”19 
 
In R v Bates & Reidy20the court said the following about the distinction between appeal and 
review: 
“The difference between an appeal and a review is that an appeal is based upon the matter 
contained in the record, while in review the appellant may travel beyond the record in order 
to rely on certain grounds, such as gross irregularity nd the admission of incompetent 
                                                          
16
 1903 TS 111. 
17
 At 114-115. 
18
 At 114. 
19
 At 111-112. 
20
 1902 TS 119 
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evidence if the appellant desires to appeal, but is not satisfied with the record as it stands he 
may proceed to apply for leave to amend it.”21 
 
In Tikly & others v Johannesburg NO & others22 the court held as follows: 
“The word ‘appeal’ can have different connotations. I  so far as is relevant to these 
proceedings it may mean: i) an appeal in the wide sense, that is, a complete re-hearing of, 
and fresh determination on the merits of the matter with or without additional evidence or 
information; ii) an appeal in the ordinary strict sen e, that is, a re-hearing on the merits but 
limited to the evidence or information on which thedecision under appeal was given, and 
in which the only determination is whether the decision was right or wrong; iii) a review, 
that is, a limited re-hearing with or without additional evidence or information to 
determine, not whether the decision under appeal was correct or not, but whether the 
arbitrators had exercised their powers and discretion honestly and properly.”23   
 
2.3 DISTINCTION IN TERMS OF THE LRA 
Where a party alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings under the auspices of the 
commission they may apply to the Labour Court for an order setting aside the arbitration 
award.24 The legislature has determined that there shall be no appeal from the decision of an 
arbitrator. 
In Coetzee v Lebea NO & others25 the court held as follows: 
“The fact that a reviewing court may have come to adifferent result if the matter had been 
brought on appeal can never be on its own, a basis for attacking the process of reasoning. If 
it did then the distinction between appeal and review would be obliterated. And whatever 
effect Constitutional entrenchment of the right to administrative justice may have on our 
common law, it does not mandate a distinction betwen these two remedies. What then 
distinguishes the two remedies when it comes to applying them to the reasoning process 
employed by a tribunal? The seeds of the distinctio lie in the phrase so commonly used to 
describe a process failure in the reasoning phase of a tribunal’s proceedings - ‘the failure to 
apply one’s mind’. That test is different from the one that applies to an appeal – namely, 
whether another court could come to a different conclusion. Accordingly, once a reviewing 
court is satisfied that the tribunal has applied its mind, it will not interfere with the result 
even if it would have come to a different conclusion. The best demonstration of applying 
                                                          
21
 At 200. 
22
 1963 (2) SA 588 (T). 
23
 At 590F-G. 
24
 Section 145(1) of the LRA. 
25
 (1999) 20 ILJ 129 (LC). 
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one’s mind is whether the outcome can be sustained by the facts found and the law applied. 




Applications for review must be filed within six weeks of the date that the award was served on 
the applicant.27 If the ground of review is some form of corruption it must be filed within six 
weeks of the date on which the applicant learned of it.28 The Labour Court may on good cause 
shown condone the late filing of a review application.29 In terms of rule 7A of the Labour Court 
Rules review applications must be brought on notice of motion, supported by affidavit, and the 
person or body responsible for the decision under review must be called upon to supply the 
record of the proceedings.  
b) Nature 
In Lekota v First National Bank of SA Ltd30the court stated the law in regard to the review of 
arbitration awards as follows: 
“It is not the function of the reviewing court when reviewing an arbitration award in terms 
of section 145 of the Act to decide whether the commissioner acted correctly or (from the 
applicant’s point of view) whether the decision by the commissioner was wrong. The 
defects that have to be shown in terms of section 145(2) of the Act (discussed above) is that 
either the commissioner (1) committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the 
commissioner as an arbitrator (this clearly would require a mala fide act on the part of the 
commissioner); (2) committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings (this clearly has to do with the conduct of the arbitration proceedings in terms 
of which a gross irregularity occurs); and (3) that the commissioner exceeded his or her 
powers.”31 
 
                                                          
26
 At 133C-F. 
27
 Section 145(1)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
28
 Section 145(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
29
 Section 145(1A) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
30
 (1998) 10 BLLR 1021 (LC). 
31
 At para 16. 
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In addition, as indicated earlier on, the Constitutional Court in Sidumo held that the requirement 
of reasonableness must be suffused into the statutory review grounds, thereby adding a further 
ground of review to the statutory grounds of review. 
 
c) Legal effect 
If a reviewing court finds an award reviewable, thecourt must send the matter back to the 
CCMA to be heard by the same commissioner or a different commissioner. However there are 
circumstances where a reviewing court may substitute s own decision for that of an inferior 
court or tribunal. Ellis and Dendy32 describe these as follows: 
“This (the notion that a court may set aside a decision but not replace it with its own) is not 
a hard and fast rule, and in certain instances the court may exercise administrative 
functions by imposing its own decision. It is essentially a question of fairness to both sides. 
This, where the court’s finding that an act or decision is invalid will result in the tribunal 
choosing the other alternative if it is referred back, the court will do so, as referral back will 
serve no purpose. Again, where all aspects of a matter have been fully canvassed and 
referring the matter back will prejudice the parties, the court will refrain from doing so. A 
court will also refrain from referring a matter back where the official or tribunal has been 




Application for leave to appeal against any final judgment or final order of the Labour Court 
must be filed with the Labour Court.34 In terms of rule 5 of the Labour Appeal Court Rules a 
notice of appeal must be filed and served within 15 days after leave to appeal has been granted, 




                                                          
32
 I Ellis & M Dendy ‘Civil Procedure: High Court’ in W.A. Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa Vol 3 Part 1 2 ed 
(2007).   
33
 At para 403. 
34




Appeals are concerned with the correctness of a result and not the procedure with which the 
result was reached. In Coates Brothers Ltd v Shanker & others35 the court set out the test for 
when the exercise of a discretion by a court may be interfered with on appeal as follows: 
“An appellant must show, in an appeal from a decision in a lower court, that the court a 
quo ‘acted capriciously, or acted upon a wrong principle, or in a biased manner, or for 
insubstantial reasons, or committed a misdirection or an irregularity, or exercised its 
discretion improperly or unfairly.”36 
 
c) Legal effect 
The appellate court may uphold, or dismiss, or refer th  matter back for rehearing.  
 
2.4 DISTINCTION BETWEEN APPEAL AND REVIEW BLURRED? 
The courts have repeatedly warned that testing the reasoning process of the arbitrator does not 
mean a complete blurring of the distinction between review and appeal. The court in Mosima v 
SA Police Service & others37 held as follows: 
“The test to apply in considering whether the grounds of review set out by an applicant 
warrant interfering with the commissioner’s arbitration award, is that of a reasonable 
decision maker as confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo & another v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others. The test to apply is whether the decision reached 
by the commissioner is one which a reasonable decision maker could not reach. In applying 
this test the court has been cautioned to guard against blurring the line between a review 
and an appeal. The test for appeal is that of determining the correctness of the decision 
maker whereas in a review the test is that of determining the reasonableness of the decision 
or whether the arbitration award suffers from any of the defects set out in s 145 of the 
LRA. Thus the difference between an appeal and a review lies in the distinction between 
the concepts of reasonableness and correctness.”38 
 
                                                          
35
 (2003) 24 ILJ 2284 (LAC). 
36
 At 5. 
37
(2012) 33 ILJ 1225 (LC). 
38
 At para 17. 
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The Court in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others39 held as follows: 
“There may well be a fine line between a review and appeal, particularly where ─ as 
here ─ the standard of review almost inevitably involves a consideration of the merits. 
However, whilst at times it may be difficult to draw the line, the distinction must not be 
blurred. The drafters of the LRA were clearly alive to the distinction. They accordingly 
sought to introduce a cheap, accessible, quick and informal alternative dispute resolution 
process. In doing so, appeals were specifically excluded.”40 
 
It went on to cite the Explanatory Memorandum41 as follows: 
“In order for this alternative process to be credible and legitimate and to achieve the 
purposes of the legislation, it must be cheap, accessible, quick and informal. These are the 
characteristics of arbitration, whose benefits over court adjudication have been shown in a 
number of international studies. The absence of an appeal from the arbitrator’s award 
speeds up the process and frees it from the legalism that accompanies appeal proceedings. 
It is tempting to provide for appeals because dismis al is a very serious matter, particularly 
given the lack of prospects of alternative employment in the present economic climate. 
However, this temptation must be resisted as appeals l d to records, lengthy proceedings, 
lawyers, legalism, inordinate delays and high costs. Appeals have a negative impact on 
reinstatement as a remedy, they undermine the basicpurpose of the legislation and they 
make the system too expensive for individuals and small business. Without reinstatement 
as a primary remedy, the draft Bill’s prohibition of strikes in support of dismissal disputes 
loses its legitimacy. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the present LAC, it was argued that an appeal structure would 
provide the consistency required to develop coherent guidelines on what constitutes 
acceptable industrial relations practice. This has not been the case. The LAC’s judgments 
lack consistency and have had little impact in ensuri g consistency in judgments of the 
industrial court. The draft Bill now regulates unfair dismissal in express and detailed terms 
and provides a Code of Good Practice to be taken into account by adjudicators. This will 
go a long way towards generating a consistent jurisprudence concerning unfair dismissal 
despite the absence of appeals.” 
 
The distinction between appeals and reviews has been criticized for not portraying what the 
courts really do on review. It has been contented that judges are often influenced by the merits of 
a matter when deciding whether or not to review and set aside arbitration awards.42  
“The distinction between review and appeal has become even more blurred since the 
enactment of the 1993 Constitution and of PAJA. For as long as the distinction remains the 
                                                          
39
(2009) 7 BLLR 619 (SCA). 
40
At para 28. 
41
 (1995) 16 ILJ 278 at 318. 
42
H  Cheadle, D Davis & N Hayson ‘South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights’ in I Curie & J De Waal 
(contributing eds) (2003)  27. 
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sole or most important factor in determining the scope of inference by a court with 
administrative decisions; a judge wishing to interfere with a decision s/he does not agree 
with, could use this artificial distinction as a front, hiding his or her true reasons for 
interference. Whether a standard of correctness or a more deferential standard is 
appropriate is one that can only be determined withreference to the context of the specific 
case, not with reference to the distinction between appeal and review.”43 
 
In Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus No & others44 the court held that suffusing the review grounds 
by the then constitutional standard of justifiability was not an attempt to blur the distinction 
between review and appeal. It held as follows: 
“But it would be wrong to read into this section an attempt to abolish the distinction 
between review and appeal. According to the New Short Oxford English Dictionary 
‘justifiable’ means ‘able to be legally or morally justified, able to be shown to be just, 
reasonable, or correct; defensible.’ It does not mean ‘just’, ‘justified’ or ‘correct’. On its 
plain meaning the use of the word ‘justifiable’ does not ask for the obliteration of the 
difference between review and appeal. Neither does the LRA itself: it makes a very clear 
distinction between reviews and appeals.”45 
 
“When the Constitution requires administrative action to be justifiable in relation to the 
reasons given for it, it thus seeks to give expression to the fundamental values of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness. It does n t purport to give courts the power to 
perform the administrative function themselves, which would be the effect if justifiability 
in the review process is equated to justness or corre tness.”46 
 
Hoexter47 acknowledges, within the context of administrative law, that the distinction between 
appeals and reviews is threatened by the examination of the merits but submits that: 
“It is, in fact, quite impossible to judge whether a decision is within the limits of reason or 
‘defensible’ without looking closely at matters such as the information before the 
administrator the weight given to various factors and the purpose sought to be achieved by 
the decision. Only cases decided on the narrowest and most technical of grounds will not 
entail such scrutiny.”48 
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The courts have also accepted that a scrutiny of the merits when deciding whether or not to 
exercise their power to review is unavoidable. This wa  justified by the court in Carephone as 
follows: 
    “In determining whether administrative action is jutifiable in terms of the reasons given for 
it, value judgments will have to be made which will, a most inevitably, involve the 
consideration of the ‘merits’ of the matter in some way or another.  As long as the judge 
determining this issue is aware that he or she enters th  merits not in order to substitute his 
or her own opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is 
rationally justifiable, the process will be in orde.”49 
 
Since the decision of the LAC in Carephone and the Constitutional Court’s subsequent decision 
in Sidumo the Labour Courts have emphasized the importance of maintaining the distinction 
between appeals and reviews, when undertaking review proceedings in accordance with section 
145 of the LRA.50 In Sidumo the court noted that the distinction between appeals and reviews 
may be easily blurred and that it is important for the courts to maintain this distinction when 
undertaking review proceedings in accordance with section 145 of the LRA.51  
 
The LAC’s judgment in Herholdt contains an obiter dictum in which the court questions the 
utility of reviews. The LAC quoting from the Explantory Memorandum held that reviews, just 
like appeals, lead to records, lengthy proceedings, lawyers, legalism, inordinate delays and high 
costs.52 The court held as follows in this regard: 
“Besides, I imagine, few decisions that are wrong are likely to be upheld as reasonable. 
Leaving aside the moral hazard of a message to commissioners that there is no need for 
them to get their decisions right, it being enough if t ey act reasonably, commissioners who 
get it wrong on the facts will usually commit the con omitant irregularity of not taking full 
or proper account of material evidence, and where they err on the law, they will fall short 
in not having properly applied their minds to the issues and thereby have denied the parties 
a fair trial. The inexorable truth is that wrong decisions are rarely reasonable. If that is true, 
the hypothetical reward from limiting intervention to a reasonableness or rationality review 
is dubious.”53  
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The LAC proposed that the legislature intervene: 
“I would therefore tentatively venture that the time has come for social partners and the 
legislature to think again. Justice for all concerned might be better served were the relief 
against wards to take the form of an appeal rather than a review. The protection granted by 




In this chapter a discussion of the general distinctio  between an appeal and a review was 
undertaken. While appeals are limited to the record, in review proceedings new evidence may be 
introduced. In an appeal the judgment of the lower court is suspended unless the court orders 
otherwise whereas in a review the reviewing court does not suspend the operation of the award 
unless the court orders otherwise. The courts have acknowledged that the distinction between 
appeals and reviews is difficult to maintain but have lso emphasized the importance of 
maintaining the distinction. The LAC and the Constitutional Court emphasized that reviews will 
involve the consideration of the ‘merits’ of the matter in some way or another.  As long as the 
judge determining this issue is aware that he or she enters the merits not in order to substitute his 
or her own opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine the reasonableness of the award 
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CHAPTER THREE  
THE GROUNDS OF REVIEW IN TERMS OF SECTION 145 OF THE LRA 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The review of arbitration awards issued under the auspices of the CCMA and bargaining 
councils are governed by section 145 of the LRA. The Labour Court may set aside arbitration 
awards issued under the auspices of the CCMA and bargaining councils if it is satisfied that there 
was a defect in the arbitration proceedings.55 In terms of section 145, a defect means that: 
a) the commissioner committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as 
an arbitrator; or 
b) the commissioner committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings; or 
c) the commissioner exceeded the commissioner’s powers; or 
d) the award was improperly obtained.56  
 
The court in Sidumo held that the requirement of reasonableness must be suffused into the 
statutory grounds of review. The court reiterated that section 145 must be interpreted in 
compliance with the Constitution.57 It ruled that section 145 must be read to ensure that 
administrative action by the CCMA is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.58 The court ruled 
that the constitutional standard of reasonableness must be taken to have suffused the grounds set 
out in section 145 if that provision is to be constitutionally compliant.59 According to this 
decision awards will be reviewable if they do not meet the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness. The requirement of reasonableness, i cluding the debates surrounding this 
requirement, is discussed in detail in chapter five.  
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Arbitrators are required to conduct themselves with propriety when conducting arbitration 
proceedings. Failure to do so may constitute misconduct. For there to be misconduct, it has been 
held that there must be some unlawful or improper conduct on the part of the decision maker.60 
Some personal turpitude is required.61 Misconduct may include serious errors of law as well as 
errors of fact.62 The ordinary meaning of misconduct will not embrace  bona fide mistake of law 
or fact.63 The leading case dealing with the meaning of misconduct is Stocks Civil Engineering 
(Pty) Ltd v Rip No & another.64 The court in this case held as follows:  
 
“A court is entitled on review to determine whether an arbitrator in fact functioned as 
arbitrator in the way that he upon his appointment impliedly undertook to do, namely by 
acting honestly, duly considering all the evidence before him and having due regard to the 
applicable legal principles. If he does this, but reaches the wrong conclusion, so be it. But if 
he does not and shirks his task, he does not function as an arbitrator and reneges on the 
agreement under which he was appointed. His award will then be tainted and reviewable. It 
is equally explicit in the agreement under which an arbitrator is appointed that he is fully 
cognisant with the extent of a limit to any discretion or powers he may have. If he is not 
and such ignorance impacts upon his award, he has not fu ctioned properly and his award 
will be reviewable. An error of law or fact may be evidence of the above in given 
circumstances, but may in others merely be part of the incorrect reasoning leading to an 
incorrect result. In short, material malfunctioning s reviewable, a wrong result per se not 
(unless it evidences malfunctioning). If the malfunctioning is in relation to his duties, that 
would be misconduct by the arbitrator as it would be a breach of the implied terms of his 
appointment.”65 
 
It has been held that a mistake on a point of law in relation to the merits of the case will not 
amount to misconduct. In Abdull & another v Cloete NO & others66 the court held a gross 
mistake of law or fact is not misconduct but may be indicative of misconduct.  
“Gross mistake could be construed as evidence of misconduct in the sense that it may have 
been so manifest that it indicated misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. In order to 
                                                          
60




 Sampson Associates (Pty) Ltd t/a Interbrand Sampson v Cities Shepherd & others (2010) 7 BLLR 746 (LC) at para 
41. 
63
 Reunert Industries (Pty) Ltd t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others (1997) 12 BLLR 1632 (LC) at 1635. 
64
(2002) 3 BLLR 189 (LAC). 
65
 At para 52. 
66
 (1998) 19 ILJ 799 (LC). 
16 
 
amount to misconduct in this sense the mistake musthave been so gross that it resulted in 
the aggrieved party not having its case fully and fairly determined.” 67 
 
The Labour Courts have held that a commissioner will be guilty of misconduct if he fails to 
apply his mind to the issues before him. In Abdull68 the court held as follows in this regard: 
“As far as misconduct is concerned, it is at least arguable that an arbitrator will make 
himself guilty of misconduct in relation to his duties as an arbitrator if he fails to apply his 
mind responsibly and fairly to the issues before him. An arbitrator that acts in this fashion 
is not conducting himself in accordance with the requirements of the LRA which enjoins 
the arbitrator to give due consideration to the issue  before him, to apply his mind thereto 
and to come to a reasoned conclusion.”69 
 
A similar approach was adopted in Carter v CCMA & others70, in which the court held as 
follows: 
“The commissioner clearly failed to apply her mind properly to the material issue of the 
possible alternative meanings of the contentious words under consideration. This prevented 
her from making a balanced evaluation of the applicant’s prospects of success. In the 
circumstances, the commissioner’s failure was such that the applicant was denied a fair 
hearing which constituted misconduct in the performance of her duties as an arbitrator.”71 
 
Misconduct includes bias. The test for bias is the existence of a reasonable apprehension.72 A 
few examples where CCMA commissioners conduct have been held to constitute misconduct 
must suffice. In County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Theron NO & others73 where a commissioner had 
questioned two of the employer’s witnesses in a manner that essentially amounted to cross 
examination, the court held the commissioner’s conduct had given rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias. It has been held that a commissioner who adopts an inconsistent procedure 
during the proceedings commits reviewable misconduct if it can be shown that such inconsistent 
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procedure was prejudicial to one party.74 Misconstruction of evidence has been held to constitute 
misconduct on the part of the commissioner.75  
 
3.3 GROSS IRREGULARITIES IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
It is important to reiterate that the defect relating to ‘a gross irregularity in the conduct of the 
arbitration proceedings’ generated discordant judgements and that this debate was examined in a 
recent decision of the SCA in Herholdt. Considering its importance for judicial and 
jurisprudence certainty, the SCA judgment, and its implications for the review ground relating to 
‘a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitrat on proceedings’ has been discussed in detail in 
a separate chapter, headed ‘the Herholdt decision’.  
“An irregularity in proceedings refers to the method of the trial, such as, for example, some 
highhanded or mistaken action which has prevented th  aggrieved party from having his case 
fully and fairly determined.”76 Unlike misconduct bona fide decisions may be grossly irregular.77 
But if the gross irregularity was committed maliciously it would probably constitute 
misconduct.78 Not every irregularity will amount to a defect. In order to amount to a defect the 
irregularity must be a gross one and therefore must be material.79 Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA 
& others80 provides an example. In this case it was held that judgment calls are a process of 
decision making, and they do not constitute gross irregularities.81 “When all of the evidence is 
taken into account, when there is no irregularity of a material kind in that evidence was ignored, 
or improperly rejected, or where there was not a full opportunity for an examination of all 
aspects of the case, then there is no gross irregularity.”82  
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The phrase ‘a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings’ has been held to 
refer to two types of irregularities. The first are procedural irregularities which relate to how the 
arbitrator conducted the proceedings. The second are latent irregularities which relate to the 
failure of proper reasoning by the commissioner. In Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v 
Radebe & others83 the court referred to the case of Goldfields Investments Ltd & another v City 
of Johannesburg and another84 which stated the following about gross irregularities: 
“It seems to me that gross irregularities fall broadly into two classes, those that take place 
openly, as part of the conduct of the trial – they might be called patent irregularities – and 
those that take place inside the mind of the judicial officer, which are only ascertainable 
from the reasons given by him and which might be called latent. Neither in the case of 
latent nor in the case of patent irregularities need th re be any intentional arbitrariness of 
conduct or any conscious denial of justice. The crucial question is whether it prevented a 
fair trial of the issue. If it did prevent a fair trial of the issues then it will amount to a gross 
irregularity. In matters relating to the merits themagistrate may err by taking a wrong one 
of several possible views or he may err by mistaking or misunderstanding the point in 
issue. In the latter case it may be said that he is in a sense failing to address his mind to the 
true point to be decided and therefore failing to aff rd the parties a fair trial. But that is not 
necessarily the case. Where the point relates only t  the merits of the case, it would be 
straining the language to describe it as a gross irregularity or a denial of a fair trial. One 
would say that the magistrate has decided the case fairly but has gone wrong on the law. 
But if the mistake leads to the court’s not merely missing or misunderstanding a point of 
law on the merits, but to its misconceiving the whole nature of the enquiry, or of its duties 
in connection therewith, then it is in accordance with the ordinary use of the language to 
say that the losing party has not had a fair trial.” 
 
3.3.1 Procedural irregularities 
As stated earlier on, procedural irregularities generally relate to how an arbitrator conducted the 
proceedings (the procedures used). They are ‘patent’ irregularities which appear from the record. 
Procedural irregularities may be illustrated by many examples from case law. In Minister of 
Safety & Security v De Vos & others85 the court held that the failure of the commissioner to join 
a party with an interest in the matter amounted to a gross irregularity in the conduct of the 
arbitration proceedings. In SA Clothing Services Ltd v Steel Mining & Commercial Workers 
Union & others86 a dispute over the dismissal of an employee was referred to the CCMA, a 
CCMA commissioner ruled that the employee did not wish to testify and that there was no need 
for her to do so because he had already testified on her behalf. The court held that that the LRA 
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permits an employee to be represented at arbitration pr ceedings does not mean that a 
representative can give evidence on her behalf in respect of matters on which the representative 
is not competent to testify. The commissioner’s conduct was held to amount to a gross 
irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. 
 
In Scholts v Maseko NO & others87 a commissioner had failed to inform an employee that he had 
a discretion to allow her legal representation in terms of section 140 of the LRA. The court found 
that there was a duty on the commissioner, in fairness, to advise the parties of the provisions of 
section 140(1) so that the factors mentioned there may be properly addressed by the parties. This 
was held to constitute an irregularity and the award was reviewed and set aside. In U iversity of 
the North v Mthombeni88 it was contented that a commissioner had refused th university the 
opportunity to testify and to call witnesses in support of its case.  The court referred to Pep 
Stores v Adv Laka89 where it was held that within the context of the LRA conduct is reviewable 
if it can be shown that it resulted in a failure of justice. The court concluded that the 
commissioner’s conduct had led to injustice and his award was reviewable. In Topics (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA & others90 a commissioner had attempted to force parties to conciliate without the 
employer’s consent. The court held that the commissioner’s conduct amounted to a reviewable 
irregularity.   
 
In Leboho v CCMA & others91 it was contented that the arbitrator had based his ecision on 
hearsay evidence. Secondly, that the arbitrator had committed a gross irregularity when, the 
hearing having been concluded with closing argument on 26 November 2003, he re-opened it 
and mero mutu called further witnesses on the 26 January 2004. It was also contended that this 
also showed bias on the part of the arbitrator. The court held that a presiding officer has no 
power to mero motu to call witnesses. He can only do so with the consent of the litigants. The 
court found that the arbitrator had committed a gross irregularity in re-opening the hearing and 
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calling and re-calling witnesses without the consent of the parties. In C/K Alliance (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Greenland v Mosala No & others92, the commissioner allowed a material witness to remain in 
the hearing and then barred her from testifying because she had done so. The absence of the 
witness’s testimony affected the outcome. The court stated that arbitrators must warn parties if 
they intend to apply the rule and, in any event, winesses are not precluded from testifying 
merely because they have heard earlier testimony, especially if they are called to testify on 
aspects not dealt with earlier. The award was reviewed and set aside. 
 
 In Mutual & federal Insurance Co Ltd v CCMA & others93 a commissioner’s failure to afford 
the parties an opportunity to present closing arguments was held to constitute a reviewable 
irregularity. In Afrox Ltd v Laka & others94 the commissioner’s refusal to admit minutes of 
disciplinary and appeal hearings on the grounds that they were not material was held to 
constitute a reviewable irregularity. In Legal Aid Board v John NO & another,95 the failure by a 
commissioner to allow a party to lead relevant evidnce constituted a reviewable irregularity. In 
B & D Mines (Pty) Ltd v Sebothe No & another96 the arbitrator’s ruling that questions can only 
be put to witnesses through their representative or the arbitrator was held to have undermined the 
rules of cross-examination and had therefore amounted to a gross irregularity. A commissioner’s 
conduct was held to constitute a gross irregularity where she placed the onus of establishing 
fairness of dismissal on the employee rather than te employer.97 
 
3.3.2 Latent irregularities 
As indicated earlier on latent irregularities generally refer to the reasoning process: errors in the 
manner in which the decision-maker applied his or her mind. In the recent decision of the SCA 
of Herholdt the court held a result will only be unreasonable if it were one that a reasonable 
arbitrator could not reach on the material facts before him or her. “Material errors of fact, as well 
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as the weight and relevance to be attached to particular facts, were not by themselves sufficient 
for an award to be set aside, but were only of any consequence if their effect were to render the 
outcome unreasonable.”98 A 'latent irregularity' would thus be a ground forreview only if the 
arbitrator had undertaken the wrong enquiry or undertak n it in the wrong manner.99 Latent 
irregularities may be classified into three categories. These are errors of fact, errors of law, and 
errors of logic. 
 The development of the notion of latent irregularities as assumed by the Labour Courts is 
discussed below.   
 
 
a) Errors of fact 
Errors of fact, as illustrated by the case law below, ften arise from failure to apply and have 
regard to relevant evidence; incorrect interpretations of evidence; erroneous conclusions drawn 
from evidence; being influenced by irrelevant evidence; findings not supported by evidence. 
In Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Ngqeleni & others100 the commissioner had failed to 
assess the credibility and reliability of the witness s and failed to consider the probability and 
improbability of each party’s version. The court, referring to Anton Myburgh101, held that if the 
applicant could show that had the commissioner reasoned correctly he would have arrived at a 
different conclusion the award would be reviewable du to irregularity.102 The court found that 
the award may have differed if not for the failure. In setting aside the award the court held as 
follows: 
“Regrettably, the commissioner’s logic (or, more accurately, the lack of it) permeates many 
of the awards that are the subject of review proceedings in this court. Some commissioners 
appear wholly incapable of dealing with disputes of fact – their awards comprise an often 
detailed summary of the evidence, followed by an “analysis” that is little more than a 
truncated regurgitation of that summary accompanied by a few gratuitous remarks on the 
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evidence, followed by a conclusion that bears no logical or legal relationship to what 
precedes it. What is missing from these awards (the award under review in these 
proceedings is one of them) are the essential ingredients of an assessment of the credibility 
of the witnesses, a consideration of the inherent probability or improbability of the version 
that is proffered by the witnesses, and an assessment of the probabilities of the 
irreconcilable versions before the commissioner.”103  
 
Arbitration proceedings which have been vitiated by errors of fact include the following: 
An award was set aside because the commissioner fail d to apply the cautionary rule to the 
evidence of a single witness, or to draw adverse infere ce from the party’s failure to call material 
witnesses.104 A commissioner’s finding that the employee’s dishonesty arose from depression, 
where there had been no evidence regarding the employee’s psychological state before the 
commissioner was held to constitute a reviewable irregularity.105 The Labour Courts have set 
aside awards where the commissioner reinstated an employee for a dismissal found to be only 
procedurally unfair,106 where the commissioner based his finding solely on record of disciplinary 
hearing without admitting it as evidence,107 where the commissioner found in favour of an 
employee on the basis of a disputed fact in respect of which she did not testify,108  where the 
findings of the commissioner were not supported by the evidence before her the award was held 
to constitute a gross irregularity,109 and where the commissioner framed the issue as one relating 
to item 2(1)(b) of schedule 7 of the LRA when the issue was clearly a dispute under item 
2(1)(a).110 An award was also set aside where the commissioner’s conclusions were not 
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b) Errors of law 
The courts have held that statutory arbitrators are obliged to follow the judgments of the Labour 
Court and LAC.112 In Le Roux v CCMA & others113 an arbitrator who had departed from the 
terms of the judgment of the LAC was held to have committed a gross irregularity in the conduct 
of the arbitration proceedings. Commissioners are obliged to apply the LRA correctly.114 In 
Mzeku & others v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd & others115  the court found a commissioner who had 
reinstated employees whose dismissals were only procedurally unfair to have committed an error 
of law. In Miladys, a division of Mr Price Group Ltd v Naidoo & others 116 the commissioner 
had incorrectly found that the employee’s resignation constituted a constructive dismissal. The 
court held that the commissioner did not apply his mind seriously to the issues at hand and 
reason his way to the conclusion.117 The court held that award was so flawed that there ad not 
been a fair trial of the issues.118 In Transnet Limited v CCMA & others119 the court held a 
commissioner who had incorrectly found a dispute relating to training arbitrable to have 
committed an error of law.  In City of Cape Town v SAMWU obo Jacobs & others120 the 
arbitrator’s misconception of the law relating to the propriety of holding a second disciplinary 
enquiry was found to constitute a gross irregularity. An error of law has been held to render an 
award reviewable only if it can be attributed to one of the statutory grounds for review.121 
 
In Mahlamu v CCMA & others122 the commissioner had accepted the validity of automa ic 
termination clauses in employment contracts which stated that the employer could automatically 
terminate the employee’s services where the client no longer required the employee’s services 
for whatever reason. On review the court held as follows: 
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“In the present instance, the upshot of the commissioner’s award is that the applicant’s 
security of employment was entirely dependent on the will (and the whim) of the client. 
The client could at any time, for any reason, simply state that the applicant’s services were 
no longer required and having done so, that resulted in a termination of the contract, 
automatically and by the operation of law, leaving the applicant with no right of recourse. 
For the reasons that follow, to the extent that the commissioner regarded this proposition to 
be the applicable law, he committed a material error of law that must necessarily have the 
result that his ruling is reviewed and set aside.”123 
 
In Fipaza v Eskon Holdings Ltd124 the commissioner had found an employee’s dismissal 
substantively fair on the ground that she had failed to disclose that she had been dismissed for 
misconduct. The commissioner had also found that the employee’s failure to disclose this fact 
was a wilful and material misrepresentation amounting o an act of fraudulent non-disclosure. 
The court found that the commissioner had failed to give consideration to the principle that there 
is no general duty on a contracting party to tell the other all he knows about anything that may be 
material nor the fact that the employee’s earlier dsmissal was not a matter within her exclusive 
knowledge.  The court went on to state when an error of law will warrant the setting aside of an 
award on review. The court held as follows:  
“Even so, it might be argued that insofar as the commissioner erred in law, it is not for the 
court to interfere as a simple mistake of law does not justify setting aside an arbitrator's 
decision. It is well established though that where a mistake of law is such that it results in 
the arbitrator misconceiving the nature of the enquiry and addressing the wrong issue the 
arbitrator's decision may be set aside, provided that if the result would still have been the 
same had the arbitrator adopted the correct approach the arbitrator's decision will still 
stand.”125 
    
In Local Road Transportation Board & another v Durban City Council & another,126 the court 
referred to Goldfields investment Ltd where it was held: 
“A mistake of law per se is not an irregularity but its consequences amount to a gross 
irregularity where a judicial officer, although perfectly well-intentioned and bona fide, does 
not direct his mind to the issue before him and so prevents the aggrieved party from having 
his case fully and fairly determined.”127 
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Errors of logic 
Examples of cases where awards have been set aside on th basis of constituting errors of logic 
include findings that a constructive dismissal is procedurally unfair but substantively fair,128 
failure by the commissioner to realize that the dismis ed employee and the person found to have 
committed a misconduct were one and the same person,129 commissioner’s reasons which were 
not capable of being understood and mutually contradictory in material respects,130 a finding by a 
commissioner that an employee was not guilty of an offence but refused to reinstate the 
employee and only granted a quarter of the compensatio  which the employee was entitled to 
under the LRA,131 and a finding that an employee did not commit a misconduct based on the 
employer’s delay in instituting disciplinary action.132 
 
3.3.2.1 Failure to apply the mind 
The failure by commissioners to apply the mind as aground of review applies when an arbitrator 
fails to have regard to material facts, or ignored, or gave excessive weight to immaterial 
evidence, or gave insufficient weight to relevant evid nce, or drew conclusions from evidence 
which were supported by neither law nor logic.133  
In Sidumo, Ngcobo J held as follows:  
 
“It is plain from these constitutional and statutory provisions that CCMA arbitration 
proceedings should be conducted in a fair manner. The parties to a CCMA arbitration must 
be afforded a fair trial. Parties to the CCMA arbitrations have a right to have their cases 
fully and fairly determined. Fairness in the conduct of the proceedings requires a 
commissioner to apply his or her mind to the issues that are material to the determination of 
the dispute. One of the duties of a commissioner in co ducting an arbitration is to 
determine the material facts and then to apply the provisions of the LRA to those facts in 
answering the question whether the dismissal was for a air reason. In my judgment, where 
a commissioner fails to apply his or her mind to a m tter which is material to the 
determination of the fairness of the sanction, it can hardly be said that there was a fair trial 
of issues. 
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It follows, therefore, that where a commissioner fails to have regard to material facts, the 
arbitration proceedings cannot, in principle, be said to be fair because the commissioner 
fails to perform his or her mandate. In so doing, i the words of Ellis, the commissioner’s 
action prevents the aggrieved party from having its ca e fully and fairly determined. This 
constitutes a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings, as 
contemplated in s 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA. And the ensuing award falls to be set aside not 
because the result is wrong but because the commissioner has committed a gross 




Examples abound. An award was set aside where the commissioner failed to consider the fact 
that an employee in a constructive dismissal dispute failed to exhaust alternative remedies.135 An 
award was also set aside where the commissioner fail d to take into account the employer’s offer 
of retrospective reinstatement.136 
 
3.4 EXCESS OF POWER 
This ground relates to commissioners exceeding powers set out in the LRA. A commissioner will 
exceed the powers conferred by the LRA when the commissioner strays from the ambit of 
jurisdiction or makes a ruling or awards a remedy which is beyond the powers conferred by the 
LRA.137 
Awards have been set aside on account of commissioner  having exceeded their powers where 
commissioners have purported to determine disputes in the absence of jurisdiction to do so,138 
and where a commissioner had made an award in favour of dismissed employees after another 
commissioner had held that commission had lacked jurisdiction because of late referral.139 A 
commissioner was held to have exceeded its jurisdict on by not ensuring that the compensation 
awarded in terms of s 194(2) of the LRA was not less than the amount specified in s 194(1).140 A 
commissioner was found to have exceeded his powers here he ordered reinstatement of 
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employees whose dismissals were only procedurally unfair.141 A commissioner was held to have 
exceeded his powers where he awarded an employee 14 months remuneration as 
compensation.142 An award was also set aside where the arbitrating commissioner decided that 
the commission lacked jurisdiction despite the facttha  a certificate of non-resolution conferring 
the necessary jurisdiction upon the arbitrating commissioner to arbitrate the dispute referred to it 
had been issued.143 
 
It has been held that any pronouncement on jurisdict on remains subject to the review powers of 
the Labour Court.144  
 
“Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent o  the existence of a particular state of 
affairs; it cannot give itself jurisdiction by incorrectly finding that the conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction are satisfied. The conditions precedent to jurisdiction are known as 
“jurisdictional facts” which must objectively exist before the tribunal has power to act; 
consequently a determination on the jurisdictional facts is always reviewable by the courts 




3.5. AN AWARD HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY OBTAINED 
This ground relates to the misconduct of the party nd not the arbitrator. In Moloi v Euijen & 
others146 Maserumule AJ stated the following: 
 
“The grounds of review set out in the section distinguishes between misconduct by the 
commissioner (section 145(2)(a)(i)) and the imprope obtaining of an award as a separate 
ground of review (section 145(2)(b)). In my view, the latter subsection contemplates a 
situation where the one party to the arbitration, through fraud or other improper means, 
obtains an award in his or her favour. This can either be in the form of a bribe or by 
misleading and false or fraudulent representations which lead to an award being granted in 
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that party’s favour. It is different, in my opinion, from a charge that the commissioner 
misconducted himself, although it is quite possible that the commissioner’s misconduct 
may give rise to the improper obtaining of an award. For example, if a party to an 
arbitration bribes the commissioner and obtains an award in its favour, the award would 




In Lekota148the court rejected the allegation that an award had been improperly obtained because 





In the above discussion it has been established that it is important for arbitrators to act honestly 
during arbitration proceedings, apply their minds to the issues, and not exceed their powers. In 
terms of the statutory grounds listed in section 145, an arbitrator is required to give due 
consideration to the evidence before him or her and have regard to the applicable legal 
principles. Failure to do so may constitute misconduct. Improper interest in the case, bias and 
corruption will also amount to misconduct. Gross irregularity in the conduct of proceedings 
refers to the process by which the result was reached. Unlike misconduct bona fide decisions 
may be grossly irregular. Awards will be set aside on the ground of excess of power where 
arbitrators exceed the powers set out in the LRA, for example, where they grant relief greater 
than that permitted by the Act. An example of an award that was improperly obtained is where a 
party to the dispute obtains the award through, for example, bribery or fraud. This ground relates 
to the misconduct of the party and not the arbitrator.  
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THE REVIEW OF PRIVATE ARBITRATION AWARDS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the LRA provides for the resolution of disputes arising 
under the LRA by adjudication or arbitration. However, employers and employees can also agree 
to resolve disputes arising under the LRA outside the statutory framework.  They may choose to 
resolve disputes by arbitration under the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.  
In Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union & others v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd & 
others the Labour Court confirmed that the grounds on which a private arbitration award can be 
reviewed are confined to those set out in s 33(1)(a) and (b) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
The applicants claimed that a private arbitrator, charged with determining whether certain 
agreements had been lawfully terminated, who had failed to determine the validity of the 
termination of a supplementary agreement as a separat  issue, had committed a latent gross 
irregularity. The court considered the test to be applied for a review in the case of a 'non-
determination', and confirmed that the failure to determine an issue could potentially constitute a 
latent gross irregularity. However, the court found that the arbitrator's determination had been 
wide enough to encompass a determination that the supplementary agreement had been lawfully 
terminated. Whether his answer was right or wrong was immaterial. He did not commit a gross 
irregularity. 
 
4.2 GROUNDS OF REVIEW 
The grounds on which an award may be set aside are similar to those provided for in section 145 
of the LRA, discussed above. A court may set aside an award on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
a) Where an arbitrator committed misconduct in relation  his or her duties;  




c) Where an arbitrator  exceeded his or her powers; 
d) Where the award was improperly obtained.  
 
4.2.1 Misconduct  
Arbitrators are required to be impartial when conducting arbitration proceedings, any evidence 
that they have been partial to one side will constitute misconduct. As stated in the previous 
chapter, for there to be misconduct there must be some unlawful or improper conduct on the part 
of the decision maker. Misconduct does not include bona fide mistakes of law or fact, unless the 
mistake is so gross as to provide evidence of misconduct in the strict sense.149 
4.2.2 Gross irregularities 
Gross irregularities in the proceedings apply to the manner in which arbitration proceedings are 
managed, not to their result.150 An irregularity must be serious enough to prevent a party from 
having its case properly and fairly determined.151 An award was set aside where the arbitrator 
totally misconstrued the provisions of a disciplinary code he was required to interpret.152 In 
reviews of statutory arbitrations irregularities may be either patent or latent. In reviews private 
arbitrations, the following dictum is frequently cited: “An irregularity in proceedings does not 
mean an incorrect judgment: it refers not to the result, but to the method of a trial, such as, for 
example, some high-handed or mistaken action which as prevented the aggrieved party from 
having his case fully and fairly determined.”153 In other words, some minor error of law or fact 
or reasoning is not in itself sufficient to warrant review. 
 
In Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd,154 the SCA ruled that the extension of the 
common law grounds of review do not apply to arbitration proceedings, and drew a distinction 
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between grounds attacking the method by which decision-makers reached their conclusions 
(including the procedure followed and the reasoning process) and the result.  Attacks on the 
result of proceedings are not permissible on review, because that would confuse review and 
appeal. In Telcordina the High Court had itself interpreted the contract the arbitrator was 
required to interpret, preferred a different interpr tation, then concluded that the arbitrator had 
‘misconceived the nature of the inquiry’. The SCA found this reasoning circular and wrong. The 
court found that it was not for the High Court to reinterpret the contract; its function was to 
determine whether the gross irregularities alleged ha  been committed.155 
According to the Constitutional Court in Sidumo the test for review is ‘whether the decision 
reached is one that a reasonable commissioner couldn t reach’. On this test the court needs to 
examine the conclusions reached by the arbitrator as well as the process by which it was reached. 
However where the private arbitrator reaches a conclusion that is manifestly irrational, 
unreasonable, arbitrary and unrelated to the evidence, it may be assumed that he or she failed to 
discharge his obligations as arbitrator. This failure may be referred to as a gross irregularity. 
 
4.2.3 Excess of power  
Arbitrators will exceed their powers where they take decisions outside their terms of reference, 
and where they decide issues not properly before them unless it is a collateral issue or an issue 
which is immaterial to the main issue.  
 
4.2.4 Award was improperly obtained 
This relates to the misconduct of the party and not the arbitrator. An award is improperly 
obtained if parties influence the arbitrator to find i  their favour by direct inducement. An 
example of an improperly obtained award is a bribe or fraud.  
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4.3 TIME LIMITS 
Application for review of private arbitration awards must be launched within six weeks from the 



















                                                          
156
 Section 33(1) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
33 
 
CHAPTER FIVE  
THE REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS (THE SIDUMO TEST) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Sidumo the Constitutional Court had to determine two contrve sial findings by the SCA. The 
first finding of the SCA was that commissioner’s conducting CCMA proceedings should defer to 
employers because it is primarily the function of the employer to decide on sanction. The second 
finding was that CCMA arbitration proceedings constitute administrative action as defined in s 1 
of Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000157 and are subject to the extended ground 
of review set under PAJA. The Constitutional Court evaluated these findings and rejected both of 
them. The court had to then determine if the grounds i  section 145 of the LRA are 
constitutionally compliant. The court held that, based on section 33 of the Constitution, 
commissioners are obliged to render reasonable decisions and that this obligation suffuses the 
grounds set out in section 145 of the LRA. 
After the decision in Sidumo the test for review should have been clear. However, it has 
generated numerous conflicting judgments.  
 
5.2 BACKGROUND 
Initially  different views had been expressed by the courts over whether CCMA arbitration 
awards could be set aside only on the grounds listed n section 145 of the LRA, or whether the 
wider grounds mentioned in section 158(1)(g) were applicable. Some decisions had expressed 
that to allow review on the wider grounds permitted un er the Constitution and the common law 
would frustrate the LRA’s goal of ending labour disputes efficiently; while others had held that 
the wider grounds should be permitted because the LRA was designed to give effect to the Bill 
of Rights, which guaranteed fair administrative action.158 Carephone was considered to have put 
an end to this controversy. The court in Carephone had formulated a test for the standard to be 
used, in determining whether or not there is a ground for reviewing a CCMA arbitration award, 
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namely the justifiability and rationality test. The court had held that the question to be asked was: 
“whether there is a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the administrative 
decision-maker between the material properly available to him and the conclusion he or she 
eventually arrived at.”159 This test incorporated the Constitutional requirement that an 
administrative action must be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it.160 
 
 In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others161 the issue before the court was the 
grounds on which a CCMA arbitration award can be reviewed. The court had to determine 
whether the Carephone decision was still applicable. It referred to the Pharmaceutical case 
where it was held that irrationality of a CCMA arbit ation award was a ground of review and 
held that if the terms justifiable and irrational were synonymous then there was no need to 
interfere with the Carephone decision.162 The court found that the test was not “justifiability” but 
rather “rationality”. The court concluded that the court in Carephone viewed the concept of 
justifiability as related to the concept of rationality, and that the terms bore a sufficiently similar 
meaning to justify the conclusion that rationality can be said to be accommodated with the 
concept of justifiability.163 The court held that a decision that is justifiable cannot be said to be 
irrational and a decision that is irrational cannot be said to be justifiable, and held therefore that
the test in Carephone was applicable.  This position remained until the decision in Sidumo. 
 
 According to Sidumo the review grounds in section 145 are now suffused by the Constitutional 
standard of reasonableness. The standard being: “is the decision reached by the commissioner 
one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach?.”164 This is because of the change in the 
wording of the final Constitution. In terms of Carephone section 145 was suffused by the then 
Constitutional standard that an administrative decision must be reasonable in relation to the 
                                                          
159
 At para 37. 
160
 S 24(d) of the interim Constitution 1993. 
161
(2001) 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC). 
162
 At para 21. 
163
 At para 22. 
164
 At para 110. 
35 
 
reasons given for it. Section 33(1)165 of the final Constitution provides that administrative action 
should be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.In Carephone the grounds in section 145 
were suffused by justifiability found in the 1993 Constitution and now they are suffused by 
reasonableness found in the final Constitution.  
 
5.2.1 Facts 
 Sidumo involved a dismissal of a security guard (Sidumo) who was responsible for monitoring 
access to and exits from a high security facility where high grade precious metals were separated 
from lower grade concentrate. Sidumo was dismissed for negligently failing to follow prescribed 
search procedures.  He referred a dispute to the CCMA. The commissioner found Sidumo had 
been guilty of misconduct, but held that dismissal w s unfair. The commissioner reinstated him 
subject to a final written warning, and awarded himcompensation equivalent to three months’ 
wages.  
 
The employer took the matter to review but the Labour Court dismissed the action with costs. 
The employer appealed to the LAC, which held that, the commissioner’s finding that the 
dismissal was too harsh a sanction was justifiable. On further appeal, the SCA overturned the 
LAC’s judgment and ruled that the dismissal was fair. The SCA had based its decision on two 
legs. Firstly, that the commissioner failed to properly appreciate the ambit of his duties under the 
LRA, and therefore had applied the incorrect test when considering whether the dismissal was a 
fair sanction.166 Secondly, that the test for rational administrative action laid down by PAJA 
applied to reviews of CCMA arbitration awards -i.e that their decisions must be rationally 
connected to the information before them and to the reasons given by them.167 The matter was 
then taken to the Constitutional Court which did not agree with the decision of the SCA.    
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5.3 PAJA OR THE LRA 
One of the issues the Constitutional Court had to de ermine in Sidumo was whether the SCA was 
correct in finding that arbitration by the CCMA in terms of the LRA constitutes “administrative 
action” as defined in PAJA and is therefore subject to the standard of review set under that Act 
rather than that provided for in the LRA.168 The Court confirmed that a commissioner conducting 
a CCMA arbitration is performing an administrative action.169 However, it did not agree that 
CCMA arbitration proceedings were subject to review under PAJA. The court provided reasons 
for rejecting the SCA’s findings. It held that PAJA was not regarded as the exclusive legislative 
basis for review.170  “Nothing in s 33 of the Constitution precludes specialised legislative 
regulation of administrative action such as s 145 of the LRA alongside general legislation such 
as PAJA.”171 The court found that the LRA constitutes national legislation in respect of 
administrative action within the specialised labour law sphere:  
“S 33(3) of the Constitution provides that national legislation must be enacted to give effect 
to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. S 145 
of the LRA constitutes national legislation in respct of “administrative action” within the 
specialised labour law sphere. The LRA, including s 145 was in place at the time that the 
Constitution came into force. S 33(3) read with item 23(1) of schedule 6 to the Constitution 
contemplates that the national legislation referred to in s 33 of the Constitution is to be 
enacted in the future. It is clear that what was envisaged was legislation of general 
application. PAJA was the resultant legislation. The definition of administrative action in 




The court held that its reasons for rejecting the SCA’s finding were supported by section 210 of 
the LRA which states that “If any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises 
between this Act and the provisions of any other law save the Constitution or any Act expressly 
amending this Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail.”173 The court also referred to the fact 
that courts have applied the principle that general legislation does not derogate from special 
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legislation, unless specifically indicated. In the court’s view the SCA had erred in holding that 
PAJA was applicable to the review of CCMA arbitration awards 
 
5.4. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: REASONABLENESS 
In Sidumo the court had to consider whether the standard of review set out in section 145 of the 
LRA is constitutionally compliant.174 The court found that the correct standard to be applied was 
the reasonableness standard used in Bato Star. The court referred to section 3 of the LRA which 
provides that the provisions of the LRA must be intrpreted in compliance with the Constitution 
and found therefore that section 145 must be read to ensure that administrative action by the 
CCMA is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.175 In summation the court found that:  
“The Carephone test, which was substantive and involved greater scrutiny than the 
rationality test set out in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, was formulated on the basis of the 
wording of the administrative justice provisions of the Constitution at the time, more 
particularly, that an award must be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it”176. 
 
The court then found that since section 33(1) of the Constitution presently states that everyone 
has a right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, the 
reasonableness standard should now suffuse section 145 of the LRA.177 The court made a 
distinction between the approach enunciated in Carephone with regard to the grounds of review 
set out in section 145 of the LRA and the constitutional standard of reasonableness: 
“Carephone held that s 145 of the LRA was suffused by the then constitutional standard 
that the outcome of an administrative decision should be justifiable in relation to the 
reasons given for it. The better approach is that s145 is now suffused by the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness. That standard is the one xplained in Bato Star: Is the decision 
reached by the commissioner one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach?.”178 
 
The court held that applying this test will give effect not only to the constitutional right to fair 
labour practices but also to the right to administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and 
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procedurally fair.179  The grounds in section 145 of the LRA are now suffused by the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness. 
 
5.5 REASONABLENESS: INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
After the Sidumo judgment was handed down questions arose as to its interpretation and 
application. The Labour Courts have attempted to interpret and apply the Sidumo test. A 
discussion of how the courts have interpreted the reasonable decision maker t st will be 
undertaken. Firstly, it is important to consider whether a reviewing court is entitled to justify 
commissioners’ decisions with reasons he might have applied but did not apply. Secondly, it 
must be considered whether the courts have interpret d asonableness as a test for review or as a 
further ground of review.  
 
5.5.1 Reasonableness interpreted 
One of the leading explications of the Sidumo test by the LAC is the case of Fidelity Cash 
Management Services v CCMA.180 The judge in that case had the following to say about Sidumo:  
“The test is a stringent test that will ensure thatawards are not lightly interfered with. It 
will ensure that, more than before, and in line with the objectives of the Act and 
particularly the primary objective of the effective resolution of disputes, awards of the 
CCMA will be final and binding as long as it cannot be said that such a decision or award 
is one that a reasonable decision maker could not have made in the circumstances of the 
case. It will not be often that an arbitration award is found to be one that a reasonable 
decision maker could not have made”181.    
 
A question that arose in Sidumo was whether, on review, a court should ask itself whether the 
conclusion reached by the commissioner was capable of ing sustained on the evidence 
presented at the arbitration, even if the commissioner’s conclusion was not strictly speaking 
justified by the reasons given in the award. The court in Fidelity cash management held that in 
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order to succeed with a reasonableness review, both the reasons and the result of the award must 
be unreasonable. Flawed reasoning will not be reviewable if the decision of the commissioner 
could ultimately be sustained on the evidence before him. The court held as follows: 
 
“there can be no doubt under Sidumo that the reasonableness or otherwise of a 
commissioner’s decision does not depend-at least not solely-upon the reasons that the 
commissioner gives for the decision. In many cases th  reasons which the commissioner 
gives for his decision, finding or award will play  role in the subsequent assessment of 
whether or not such decision or finding is one thata reasonable decision maker could or 
could not reach. However, other reasons upon which t e commissioner did not rely to 
support his or her decision or finding but which can render the decision reasonable or 
unreasonable can be taken into account. This would clearly be the case where the 
commissioner gives reasons A, B and C in his or her award but, when one looks at the 
evidence and other material that was legitimately bfore him or her, one finds that there 
were reasons D, E and F upon which he did not rely but could have relied which are 
enough to sustain the decision.”182  
 
And further:  
“whether or not an arbitration award or decision or finding of a CCMA commissioner is 
reasonable must be determined objectively with due regard to all the evidence that was 
before the commissioner and what the issues were that were before him or her. There is no 
reason why an arbitration award or a finding or decision that, viewed objectively, is 
reasonable should be held to be unreasonable and set asid  simply because the 
commissioner failed to identify good reasons that exist d which could demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the decision of finding.”183 
 
 
However, it has been acknowledged by the LAC that tere are limits to the extent to which a 
commissioner’s decision can be justified by a reviewing court with reasons he might have 
applied but did not. Maepe v CCMA & another184 provides an example. In Maepe a senior 
commissioner of the CCMA was found guilty of sexual h rassment and was dismissed. After 
arbitration the commissioner found the employee’s conduct fell short of sexual harassment, 
although it was inappropriate. However, the commissioner ruled that dismissal was too harsh a 
sanction, and ordered the CCMA to reinstate the employee subject to a final written warning. 
The order of the commissioner was set aside on review, and replaced with a finding that the 
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dismissal was fair. On appeal the court had to determine whether the reinstatement was 
competent. The employer contended that reinstatement was not competent because the employee 
had lied under oath during arbitration proceedings. The court noted that while commissioners are 
not required to defer to the view of employers, their awards can still be set aside on the basis of 
unreasonableness. It noted further that while it cannot always be assumed that commissioners 
have failed to apply their minds to issues simply because they are not expressly mentioned in 
their awards, commissioners can at least be expected to mention evidence critical to the issues 
they are called on to decide.  
 
In Senama v CCMA & others185 the court held that “a reasonable decision is reach d when a 
commissioner, in performing his/her functions as an arbitrator, applies the correct rules of 
evidence, and if there is to be a deviation it must not be of such a nature that it materially denies 
any party a fair hearing.”186 
A person can now bring a review to the CCMA, in addition to the grounds set out is section 145 
of the LRA, on the ground of unreasonableness. The grounds in section 145 are not obliterated 
but are suffused by reasonableness. In Fidelity Cash Management the court held as follows: 
 
“Nothing said in Sidumo means that the grounds of review in s 145 of the ACT are 
obliterated. The Constitutional Court said that they are suffused by reasonableness. 
Nothing said in Sidumo means that the CCMA’s arbitration award can no longer be 
reviewed on the grounds, for example, that the CCMA had no jurisdiction in a matter or 
any of the other grounds specified in s 145 of the Act.”187 
 
In Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetan & others188 the court held: 
“The decision of the Constitutional Court in Sidumo does not entail a shift away only from 
any degree of deference towards employers. It also:(a) as in this case, reduces the scope 
for a dissatisfied employee to take his or her dispute further; and (b) reduces the potential 
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for the Labour Courts and Supreme Court of Appeal to exercise scrutiny over the decisions 
of commissioners who are appointed to arbitrate in t rms of the LRA.”189 
 
Another important explication of  Sidumo by the LAC  is Ellerine Holdings.190 In this case the 
court held as follows: 
 “A court should eschew the red light test for review and adopt a more facilitative 
framework. By that I took him to mean that it would be wrong formalistically to pass 
through the award of second respondent, find some irregularity had taken place, that 
irregularity would set off the judicial trip wire, the red lights of review would flicker 
brightly and the result would be to sustain an application for review. A more substantive 
overall framework for review would examine the nature and role of first respondent 
(CCMA) within the broad framework of labour relations, the role played by an official 
such as second respondent (the commissioner), and the  take into account the substance of 
that decided, both in terms of its conclusion and the reasoning which underpinned the 
conclusion.”191 
 
 In Nampak Corrugated Containers v CCMA & others192  the court held as follows: 
“The key inquiry in the application of reasonable decision maker test is whether the factual 
conclusions reached by the commissioner in the award are reasonable in light of the 
evidence before him or her. Thus, an award would be unr asonable if it is found that there 
is a glaring discrepancy between the evidence present d and the conclusion reached by the 
commissioner. In other words an award would be unreasonable if the commissioner 
completely misconstrued the evidence before him or her.”193 
 
In CASU v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others194 the court held that a commissioner is obliged 
to apply his or her mind to the issues in a case.195 Commissioners who do not do so are not acting 
lawfully and reasonably and their decisions will constitutes a breach of the right to fair 
administrative justice.196 The court held further: 
 “The first obligation on an arbitrator in determining a matter is to set out the reasons, even 
if only briefly, for any decision. However, beyond the dicta referred to above, there is no 
further discussion in the commissioner's award of the text of the exemption and its 
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meaning. . . . If the commissioner had in fact applied her mind to the question of the 
meaning of the exemption, one would have expected at least some discussion of its text. 
This is nowhere evident in the award. 
 In my view, it cannot be concluded that the commissioner did apply her mind to the 
meaning of the exemption.”197 
 
In interpreting the reasonableness test, the Labour C ts have found there to be two forms of 
unreasonableness, ie process-related unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness.  
In Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others198 the court held as follows: 
“In summary, s 145 requires that the outcome of CCMA arbitration proceedings (as 
represented by the commissioner’s decision) must fall within a band of reasonableness, but 
this does not preclude this court from scrutinizing the process in terms of which the 
decision was made. If a commissioner fails to take material evidence into account, or has 
regard to evidence that is irrelevant, or the commissioner commits some other misconduct 
or a gross irregularity during the proceedings under review and a party is likely to be 
prejudiced as a consequence, the commissioner’s deci ion is liable to be set aside 
regardless of the result of the proceedings or whether on the basis of the record of the 
proceedings, that result is nonetheless capable of justification.”199  
 
Southern Sun observed there is no clear meaning of reasonableness and suggests the existence of 
a rational and coherent decision-making process that tends to produce a reasonable outcome.200 
 
In the case of Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd201 the employee was dismissed on the grounds of 
having sexually harassed his personal assistant over a p riod of two years. He took the matter to 
the CCMA for arbitration and the commissioner found that the employer had failed to show on a 
balance of probabilities that the employee was guilty of sexual harassment and reinstated him. 
The employer successfully reviewed the award in the Labour Court but the employee appealed 
against the Labour Court’s decision to the LAC. In dismissing the appeal, the LAC held that in 
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finding the employee not guilty, the commissioner had ignored relevant considerations and failed 
to apply his mind to material evidence.202 In this regard, the LAC held as follows: 
“Where a commissioner fails properly to apply his mind to material facts and unduly 
narrows the inquiry by incorrectly construing the scope of an applicable rule, he will not 
fully and fairly determine the case before him. The ensuing decision inevitably will be 
tainted by dialectical unreasonableness (process-related unreasonableness), 
characteristically resulting in a lack of rational connection between the decision and the 
evidence and most likely an unreasonable outcome (substantive unreasonableness). There 
will often be an overlap between the ground of review based on a failure to take into 
consideration a relevant factor and one based on the unreasonableness of a decision. If a 
commissioner does not take into account a factor that he is bound to take into account, his 
or her decision invariably will be unreasonable. The flaw in process alone will usually be 
sufficient to set aside the award on the ground of it being a latent gross irregularity, 
permitting a review in terms of section 145(1) read with section 145(2)(a)9ii) of the 
LRA.” 203 
 
“Although the Labour Court has previously found there to be two forms of unreasonableness, 
that the two are interlinked and that the flaw in process alone will usually be sufficient to set 
aside an award on review, it is the first time that t e LAC has done so in express terms.”204 
 
These decisions indirectly confirm the reasoning in Abdull205 and Rustenburg Platinum Mines206, 
which was overturned by the Constitutional Court in S dumo. In Rustenburg Platinum mines the 
court held that: 
 “the conclusions (outcome) of an award must be “ration lly connected” to the 
commissioner’s reasons as a whole. In a review, the question is not whether the decision is 
capable of being justified by looking at the material before the commissioner. The focus is 
on the process: on the commissioner’s logic; on the reasoning of the arbitrator; on how the 
arbitrator arrived at his decisions (conclusion andinferences); on the thought processes by 
which the commissioner reached his conclusion. The commissioner must reason 
properly.”207 
“If the reasons given for a decision are mostly badreasons, it cannot be said that the 
decision or conclusion is nevertheless rational or ‘rationally connected’ to the information 
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before the commissioner because other legitimate resons not mentioned by the arbitrator 
existed of sustaining the outcome.”208 
“If some or all of the bad reasons substantially influenced the commissioner, then the 
commissioner was influenced in his decision by irrelevant considerations. This is a ground 
of review.”209 
 
In Abdull the court held as follows: 
“Where an arbitrator does not give reasons which are c pable of being understood and 
which are, on the face of it, mutually contradictory in material respects, it is not for the 
parties or the reviewing court to attempt to rescue a r ason for findings where no such 
reason is apparent in the first place. To speculate in this fashion would be for a review 
court to substitute its reasoning for that of the arbitrator by a process of inference. This is 
not permitted on review.”210 
 
The LAC in Herholdt was considered to have settled the debate regardin the interpretation and 
applicability of the reasonableness test by holding that there are two forms of unreasonableness. 
However, this reasoning has been recently overturned by the SCA. That there are two forms of 
unreasonableness is not in line with the majority judgment in Sidumo. These decisions are 
discussed in detail in chapter five. 
 
5.5.2 Reasonableness applied  
a) Sanctions and reviews 
This requires a proper balance being struck between the interests of the employer and a proper 
weighing up and balancing of the factors in favour f the employees and the factors in favour of 
the employer. Each case must be dealt with on its own peculiar facts. Sanctions imposed by the 
employer will be reviewable where the interests and factors of one party are over emphasized 
and conversely the interests and factors of the othr party are under emphasized. They will also 
be reviewable where insufficient weight is given to certain important factors that may lessen the 
gravity of the offence or aggravate the gravity of the offence. The issue is whether relevant 
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factors cumulatively received due recognition in the determination of whether the sanction 
imposed was fair.  
 
Applying the Sidumo test as a stringent result-based test, the LAC and the SCA have refused to 
interfere with arbitration awards in the following two judgments involving sanction reviews: 
Edcon Ltd v Pillmer NO & others211 and Palaborwa Mining.212 
 
In Edcon, the employee had been employed by the employer as a quality controller and was 
entitled to the use of a company car. In the event of an accident she was required to report the 
accident to the SAPS and to her employer, to complete and sign relevant claim forms, and not to 
carry repairs without the approval of the insurance company. When the car was involved in an 
accident while being driven by her son she did not comply with the foregoing requirements and 
initially denied the accident. Later she admitted the accident but lied as to the circumstances 
during the employer’s investigations. Finally she admitted everything. After a disciplinary 
enquiry she was dismissed for failing to report the accident, which resulted in a breach of trust 
between herself and her employer. The commissioner f und that the employer had led no direct 
evidence that the trust relationship had in fact broken down, and took into account the 
employee’s long service and unblemished record, and the reasons for her initial dishonesty in 
finding that dismissal was not the appropriate sanctio . On review the Labour Court refused to 
interfere with the commissioner’s award. The LAC dism ssed an appeal by the employer, and the 
employer then appealed to the SCA. The SCA expressed its view as follows: 
“Pillemer’s (the commissioner) finding that Edcon (the employer) had led no evidence 
showing the alleged breakdown in the trust relationship is beyond reproach. In the absence 
of evidence showing the damage Edcon asserts in its trust relationship with Reddy (the 
employee), the decision to dismiss her was correctly found to be unfair. She cannot be 
faulted on any basis and her conclusion is clearly r tionally connected to the reasons she 
gave, based on the material available to her.”213   
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In Palaborwa, the employee, the company secretary, had been subjected to a random alcohol test 
in terms of the employer's policy. He was found to be under the influence of alcohol. He faced a 
disciplinary enquiry and was dismissed. The CCMA commissioner, having found that the 
dismissal was substantively and procedurally fair, confirmed the dismissal. On review, the 
Labour Court found that the dismissal of the employee had been substantively unfair by virtue of 
the commissioner's failure to give adequate consideration to the employee's personal 
circumstances. It awarded the employee compensation. In the process the Labour Court held: 
 
      “On the evidence before me, the applicant did not behave in a fashion which endangered 
others. His job description did not place him in a category where he could harm others. 
Furthermore, his demeanour could not be described by anyone as being any one of those 
listed in the code. It would appear that if he was not tested for alcohol, nobody would have 
noticed that he had consumed alcohol. Furthermore, the applicant is 58 years old and a first 
offender. These are all factors which should have been taken into account but were not.”214 
 
 
On appeal to the LAC, the court allowed the appeal and restored the commissioner’s award. In so 
doing, the court held as follows: 
 
“Despite the fact that decision makers, acting reason bly, may reach different conclusions, 
the LRA has given the decision-making power to the commissioner and there it rests, 
unless it be concluded that a reasonable decision maker could not reach such a 
conclusion.  Indeed, read together  with Bato Star, upon which the majority decision in 
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines so strongly relies, the judgment has the clear effect 
that the courts, and, in particular, the labour courts, must defer (but not in an absolute 
sense) to the decision of the commissioner.”215 
 
“If one compares the facts in casu with the facts in the case with which the Constitutional 
Court was concerned, then the obvious, inevitable and necessary conclusion is that the 
learned judge in the court a quo was clearly wrong in interfering with the award of the 




However, there are also a number of cases in which t e Labour Courts have interfered with 
arbitration awards. In Southern Sun the commissioner’s findings were reviewed and set aide 
because she failed to appreciate and apply the corrct legal principles applicable to consistency 
in the exercise of discipline and that an inconsistency claim will fail where the employer is able 
to differentiate between employees who have committed similar transgressions on the basis of 
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difference in personal circumstances, the severity of he misconduct, the fact that the other 
employees had pleaded guilty and shown remorse and other material factors which showed a 
relevant distinction. Moreover, the commissioner failed to appreciate that an employee cannot 
profit from an employer’s manifestly wrong decision in the name of consistency.  
 
In Sasol Mining217, the court reviewed and set aside the arbitrator’s award where the arbitrator 
had merely regurgitated the extensive testimony presented and made no proper attempt to 
analyse it. The court found that he had considered, i regularly, that the mere existence of 
conflicting versions between the employer and employee must lead inevitably to a finding that 
the onus of proving a fair dismissal had not been discharged by the employer. He also had 
disregarded material contradictions in the employee’s vidence and had failed to notice that 
much of the company’s evidence had gone unchallenged. 
 
In Network Field Marketing (Pty) Ltd v Mngezana NO & others218 the arbitrator’s award was 
reviewed and set aside because the arbitrator barely eva uated the evidence and did not explain 
why it was necessary to resort to, and rely solely on, credibility findings when the balance of 
probabilities so clearly favoured the employer. The arbitrator’s bold conclusion that the company 
witnesses were unreliable was based on one minor cont adiction between two witnesses. The 




Sidumo created a precedent which will make it difficult to set aside an award of a commissioner 
on review for reasonableness. The courts have interpreted the reasonableness standard as a 
ground for review rather than a test. As illustrated by case law awards will not be readily 
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CHAPTER SIX  
THE HERHOLDT DECISON 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The SCA recently delivered a decision where it had to etermine whether the Labour Courts 
have unduly relaxed the standards for review. After th  decision in Sidumo there has been a 
debate about whether section 145 provides for both a result-based and process-related review and 
whether the ground of reasonableness, introduced in that case, restricted the review to a result-
based approach. The LAC decision of Herholdt was considered to have settled this debate by 
holding that there are two forms of unreasonableness. The SCA found that the Labour Courts 
have relaxed the standards for review and that holding that there are two forms of 




Herholdt, a financial broker employed by Nedbank Ltd, was dismissed on the ground that he 
dishonestly failed to declare a conflict of interest arising from his being nominated as a 
beneficiary in the will of a client of the bank. In terms of the conflict of interest policy a conflict 
of interest may arise when an employee enters into a y engagement in which he or she may 
acquire a personal interest which may conflict with the interests of the employer or may appear 
to compromise the employee’s ability to perform his or her duties impartially. Herholdt had 
received a copy of the conflict of interest policy and had made a declaration of his conflicts of 
interests. Nedbank accordingly assumed that Herholdt was aware of the policy and should have 
known he was obliged to disclose the fact that he had been made a beneficiary in terms of the 
will of his client, Mr Smith.  
 
Two wills were relevant in the charge against Herholdt. In the first will he was nominated as a 
legatee to the proceeds of an investment valued at 92 000. In the second one Herholdt and his life 
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partner were appointed as the sole heirs to Mr Smith’s estate. Neither wills was disclosed to 
Herholdt’s line manager, Mr Snyman, as required by the conflict of interest policy. That is so 
notwithstanding the fact that Herholdt had asked his regional manager, Ms Esterhuizen, what he 
should do  if he was made the beneficiary of a client’s will and was told that in that event he had 
to disclose the details in full to line manager.  
 
Herholdt was, at first, uncomfortable with the notion of being made a beneficiary and sought 
advice from Mr Williamson, an employee of an associated company that prepared wills for 
Nedbank customers at the instance of financial advisors such as Herholdt. He was advised that 
there were possible issues of conflict of interest. He was told that a letter should be prepared and 
signed by Mr Smith confirming that he made this bequest of his own free will. He was also told 
that the fact of the bequest should be disclosed to his manager. A letter was then prepared and 
signed in accordance with the advice given by Mr Williamson but was left, together with the 
will, with Mr Williamson. After the second will was executed a similar letter was signed and left 
with Mr Williamson. Herholdt was charged and found guilty of misconduct. He then referred an 
unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. 
 
6.2.2 The CCMA 
In the CCMA, the commissioner had to decide whether Herholdt had deliberately failed to 
disclose his interest in Smith’s will to Esterhuizen and Snyman. The commissioner found that the 
Nedbank had failed to prove that Herholdt acted dishonestly, that he knew that there was a 
conflict of interest and that he had deliberately failed to disclose his benefit in terms of the 
Nedbank’s conflict of interest policy.  
 
The commissioner found that Nedbank did not have an xplicit rule speaking to the duty of an 
employee to disclose that he or she was a beneficiary in terms of a client’s will. The 
commissioner found that because the charge made no me tion of dishonesty, the charge against 
Herholdt was vague. The commissioner accepted that Herholdt had only realized that there was a 
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conflict of interest when he conceded as much under cross-examination. In the commissioner’s 
opinion neither Herholdt nor Williamson fully appreciated that there was a conflict of interest. 
She found that the letter included in the envelope with the will which was given to Williamson 
constituted sufficient disclosure to Nedbank and indicated further that Herholdt intended or 
wished to be in compliance.    
 
6.2.3 The Labour Court 
On review the Labour Court conducted a detailed analysis of the material before the 
commissioner and the commissioner’s findings and concluded that the award was not reasonable 
given the evidence and material which were placed before her and because she failed to apply 
her mind to a number of material issues and as a consequence committed gross irregularities in 
the conduct of the arbitration.  
 
With regards to the commissioner’s finding that the c arge was vague. The Labour Court held as 
follows: 
“. . . the charge clearly sets out the misconduct complained of with reference to the conflict 
of interest policy and refers to a general duty of disclosure between employee and 
employer which arises in such situations. The allegtion of a failure to disclose under the 
heading of ‘dishonesty’ alleges in effect a deliberat  non-disclosure.”219 
  
The Labour Court found unsustainable the commissioner’s finding that neither Herholdt nor 
Williamson knew that a nomination as a beneficiary n a client’s will amounted to a conflict of 
interest.220 Dealing with the commissioner’s finding that there was no rule or policy requiring 
disclosure of nomination as a beneficiary in a client’s will. According to the Labour Court’s 
opinion this finding was a manifest indication that the commissioner did not understand the 
policy or simply did not take it into account.221 The Labour Court found that Herholdt’s version 
that he only realized that there was a conflict of interest during his cross-examination fails to take 
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heed of his evidence that he was initially uncomfortable and his position of seniority.222 The 
Labour Court rejected the commissioner’s finding that t e letter filed with the will and given to 
Williamson constituted disclosure and revealed an intention or desire to be compliant.223 
According to the Labour Court this finding did not recognize the nature of the notification 
required by the policy and discounted the fact thatHerholdt did not act in accordance with the 
advice given to him by both Williamson and Esterhuizen.224  
 
6.3 THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT 
On appeal, Herholdt challenged several of the factual conclusions of the Labour Court upon 
which it based its finding that the decision of thecommissioner was unreasonable because she 
failed to apply her mind to a number of material issues and as consequence committed gross 
irregularities in the conduct of the arbitration. I dealing with these the court held as follows: 
“The finding that neither the appellant nor Williamson understood that the appellant’s 
nomination constituted a potential conflict of interests flies in the face of Williamson’s 
evidence. The appellant approached Williamson because he felt uncomfortable and thus, in 
my opinion, had more than an intuitive inkling about the existence of a conflict of interests. 
Williamson shared that view. He testified that for that very reason he advised the appellant 
to act cautiously and specifically told the appellant to disclose the bequest to Nedbank 
management so that they could have insight into the risks involved which needed to be 
managed.”225 
 
“The commissioner’s finding, on the basis of a supposed concession by the compliance 
officer Steenkamp, that the conflict of interest posed no risk to Nedbank was irrational and 
not justifiable with reference to the evidence or reasons given for the finding; hence 
reviewable. Steenkamp conceded that it was unlikely that Nedbank would lose its licence 
because of the contravention of the legislation regulating conflicts of interest. The 
commissioner however ignored Steenkamp’s evidence that the complaint would impact on 
its risk profile with FSB.”226 
 
 He contended that the Labour Court had erred in over emphasizing the process by which the 
commissioner had reached her award and that the targ t of review was the result or outcome 
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rather than the process, and if that was sustainable as reasonable, no more should be expected. 
The LAC disagreed with this submission principally because the weight of authority favours 
greater scrutiny and section 145(2) of the LRA exprssly permits the review of awards on the 
grounds of irregularity.  
 
 In the LAC two contentious findings were made. The first finding was in relation to latent 
irregularities. The second finding made by the LAC was that there are two forms of 
unreasonableness. Both these findings had been made by th  Labour Courts before the LAC 
decision in Herholdt.   
 
The first finding: Latent irregularity 
In relation to latent irregularities, the court held as follows: 
 
“Where a commissioner fails to have regard to materi l facts, this will constitute a gross 
irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings because the commissioner would 
have unreasonably failed to perform his or her mandate and thereby have prevented the 
aggrieved party from having its case fully and fairly determined.”227 
 
The LAC went on to endorse the following passage in Southern Sun228:  
“If a commissioner fails to take material evidence into account, or has regard to evidence 
that is irrelevant, or the commissioner commits some other misconduct or a gross 
irregularity during the proceedings under review and  party is likely to be prejudiced as a 
consequence, the commissioner’s decision is liable to be set aside regardless of the result of 
the proceedings or whether on the basis of the record of the proceedings, that result is 
nonetheless capable of justification.” 
 
The court went on to say: 
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“There is no requirement that the commissioner must have deprived the aggrieved party of 
a fair trial by misconceiving the whole nature of enquiry. The threshold for interference is 
lower than that; it being sufficient that the commissioner has failed to apply his mind to 
certain of the material facts or issues before him, with such having potential for prejudice 
and the possibility that the result may have been different.”229 
 
The LAC concluded: 
“The range and extent of latent irregularities in the award leave no doubt that there has not 
been a fair trial of the issues. The commissioner not o ly ignored material evidence in 
relation to the deliberate conduct of the appellant but fundamentally misconstrued the 
conflict of interests policy of the respondent with the consequence that her method in 
determining the issues was latently irregular and in the final analysis led concurrently to a 
result that was not only incorrect but substantively unreasonable in the sense that no 
reasonable commissioner, acting reasonably, could have reached the decision on the 
evidence and the inferences drawn from it.”230  
 
The court held: 
“..commissioners who get it wrong on the facts will usually commit the concomitant 
irregularity of not taking full or proper account of material evidence, and where they err on 
the law, they will fall short in not having properly applied their minds to the issues and 
thereby have denied the parties a fair trial. The inexorable truth is that wrong decisions are 
rarely reasonable. If that is true, the hypothetical reward from limiting intervention to a 
reasonableness or rationality review is dubious.”231 
 
The second finding: Dialectical unreasonableness 
The LAC recognized that there are two forms of unreasonableness: dialectical unreasonableness 
and substantive unreasonableness. “An award will be revi wable if it suffers either from 
dialectical unreasonableness or is substantively unreasonable in its outcome.”232 
 
 The LAC held as follows: 
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“Proper consideration of all the relevant and materi l facts and issues is indispensable to a 
reasonable decision and if a decision maker fails to take account of a relevant factor which 
he or she is bound to consider, the resulting decision will not be reasonable in a dialectical 
sense. Likewise, where a commissioner does not apply his or her mind to the issues in a 
case the decision will not be reasonable.”233  
 
The court held that “dialectical and substantive reasonableness are intrinsically interlinked and 
… latent process irregularities carry the inherent risk of causing an unreasonable substantive 
outcome.”234 
 
The court endorsed Ellis v Morgan235 where the court said the following: 
“But an irregularity in proceedings does not mean an incorrect judgment; it refers not to the 
result, but to the methods of a trial, such as, for example, some high-handed or mistaken action 
which has prevented the aggrieved party from having h s case fully and fairly determined.” 
 
The LAC explained this as follows: 
“If conduct of the commissioner prevents a fair trial of issues, even if perfectly well-
intentioned and bona fide, though mistaken, then such conduct will amount to a gross 
irregularity, and that will be enough successfully to found a review under s 145(2) of the 
LRA. The court by necessity must scrutinize the reasons of the commissioner not to 
determine whether the result is correct; or for that m tter substantively reasonable, but to 
determine whether there is a latent irregularity, that is, an irregularity that has taken place 
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6.4 THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL 
Herholdt appealed to the SCA against the decision of the LAC. COSATU had intervened in this 
case because it was concerned that the Labour Courts had, by admitting latent irregularities and 
dialectical unreasonableness as grounds for review, unduly watered down the standard for 
challenging CCMA awards on review. 
 
“This relaxation appears from the judgment of the LC initially and thereafter the judgment 
of the LAC where it was indicated that the ground of review of gross irregularity in respect 
of CCMA arbitrations under s 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA involves the consideration of what 
the LAC termed ‘latent irregularities’ and ‘dialectical unreasonableness’ and that these 
provide a basis for review more extensive than the lev l of unreasonableness identified as a 
ground of review in Sidumo.”237 
 
The SCA observed that after Sidumo the position in regard to reviews of CCMA arbitration 
awards should have been clear.238 It held that reviews could be brought on the unreason bleness 
test laid down by the Constitutional Court and the grounds set out in sections 145(2)(a) and (b) 
of the LRA. However, there has been a development in a different direction aimed at providing a 
more generous standard for review of CCMA arbitration awards.239 
Latent irregularity 
With regard to the approach adopted by the LAC in relation to latent irregularities, the SCA 
found that two points flow from it. The first point is that the threshold for interference with the 
award is lower than in terms of the judgment in S dumo.240 The second point flowing from the 
approach is that it is immaterial whether the result reached by the arbitrator is one that could 
reasonably be reached on the material before the arbitrator.241 The potential for prejudice is 
sufficient to warrant interference.242 
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The origin of the approach adopted by the LAC is a dictum in the minority judgment of Ngcobo 
J in Sidumo243where he said the following:  
 
“Fairness in the conduct of proceedings requires th commissioner to apply his or her mind 
to the issues that are material to the determinatio of the dispute. One of the duties of a 
commissioner in conducting an arbitration is to determine the material facts and then apply 
the provisions of the LRA to those facts in answering the question whether the dismissal 
was for a fair reason. In my judgment, where a commissioner fails to apply his or her mind 
to a matter which is material to the determination of fairness of the sanction, it can hardly 
be said that there was a fair trial of issues.”244  
 
The SCA held that this dictum results in an approach to the review of CCMA arbitration awards 
that is contrary to that endorsed by the majority judgment in Sidumo.245 The SCA held that as all 
courts are bound by the majority judgment the development of the notion of latent irregularity, in 
the sense that it has assumed in the Labour Courts, cannot be accepted.246  
The SCA held that a latent irregularity is a gross irregularity within the meaning of section 
145(2)(a)(ii) only in the limited sense, where the decision maker has undertaken the wrong 
enquiry or undertaken the enquiry in the wrong manner.247 
 
Dialectical unreasonableness 
With regard the LAC’s approach on dialectical unreasonableness, the SCA found that the 
approach is based on a dictum by Ngcobo J in Minister of Health & another NO v New Clicks 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd & others (Treatment Action Campaign & another as Amici Curiae)248  
which reads: 
 
“There is obviously an overlap between the ground of review based on failure to take into 
consideration a relevant factor and one based on the unreasonableness of the decision. A 
consideration of the factors that the decision maker is bound to take into account is 
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essential to a reasonable decision. If a decision maker fails to take into account a factor that 
he or she is bound to take into consideration, the resulting decision can hardly be said to be 
that of a reasonable decision maker.”249 
 
The SCA stated that this dictum relates to the provisi ns of PAJA and that as PAJA does not 
apply to reviews under section 145(2) it is of no application to CCMA arbitration awards.250 The 
SCA  further noted that if the dictum is applied by considering the reasoning of a CCMA 
arbitrator and determining that the reasons given for making an award are not such as to justify 
that award its effect it to resuscitate the SCA’s decision in Rustenburg Platinum Mines v CCMA 
even though that decision was expressly overruled in Sidumo.251 
The SCA went on to summarize the position regarding the review of CCMA awards as follows: 
 
“A review of a CCMA award is permissible if the defect in the proceedings falls within one 
of the grounds in s 145(2)(a) of the LRA. For a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to 
amount to a gross irregularity as contemplated by s 145(2)(a)(ii), the arbitrator must 
have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result. A result 
will only be unreasonable if it is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the 
material that was before the arbitrator. Material errors of fact, as well as the weight and 
relevance to be attached to particular facts, are not in and of themselves sufficient for an 
award to be set aside, but are only of any consequence if their effect is to render the 
outcome unreasonable.”252  
 
The SCA then applied its mind to the facts of the case in light of the tests for review it had 
confirmed to be the proper approach. The court concluded as follows: 
 
“…the issue in dispute was whether Mr Herholdt had dishonestly failed to disclose a 
conflict of interest regarding the two wills. The commissioner correctly stated in her award 
that this was the issue. She dealt exhaustively with the evidence and concluded that he had 
not been dishonest. Given the depth of her treatment of the evidence it could hardly be said 
that she misconceived the nature of the enquiry. But it is clear from the judgments of both 
the labour court and of the LAC that her conclusion was not one that a reasonable decision-
maker could have reached in the light of the evidence and the issues she was called upon to 
decide. The result was 'substantively unreasonable in the sense that no reasonable 
commissioner, acting reasonably, could have reached the ecision on the evidence and the 
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inferences drawn from it'. So, it is clear that notwithstanding its excursus on 'latent 
irregularities' and 'dialectical unreasonableness' the LAC was alive to Sidumo and applied it 
correctly.”253 
 
The findings of the SCA have been reaffirmed in the recent decision of the LAC in Gold Fields 
Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA & others.254 The LAC reiterated that 
reviews of arbitration awards are not divided into pr cess-related and result-based reviews. The 
court held that the test for review of arbitration awards is the reasonableness test set out in 
Sidumo. In this regard the court held as follows: 
“Sidumo does not postulate a test that requires a simple evaluation of the evidence 
presented to the arbitrator and based on that evaluation of the evidence presented to the 
arbitrator and based on that evaluation, a determinatio  of the reasonableness of the 
decision arrived at by the arbitrator. The court in S dumo was at pains to state that 
arbitration awards made under the Labour Relations Act (LRA) continue to be determined 
in terms of s 145 of the LRA but that the constitutional standard of reasonableness id 
“suffused” in the application of s145 of the LRA. This implies that an application for 
review sought on the grounds of misconduct, gross irregularity in the conduct of the 
arbitration proceedings, and/or excess of powers will not lead automatically to a setting 
aside of the award if any of the above grounds are found to be present. In other words, in a 
case such as the present, where a gross irregularity in the proceedings is alleged, the 
enquiry is not confined to whether the arbitrator misconceived the nature of the 
proceedings, but extends to whether the decision that the arbitrator arrived at is one that 
falls in a band of decisions to which a reasonable decision-maker could come on the 
available material.”255  
 
The court held that gross irregularity is not a self- tanding ground of review. The reviewing court 
must consider the alleged misconduct committed by the arbitrator then apply the test in Sidumo. 
The court held as follows: 
“A ‘process-related review’ suggests an extended standard of review, one that admits the 
review of an award on the grounds of a failure by the arbitrator to take material facts into 
account, or by taking into account facts that are irrelevant, and the like. The emphasis here 
is on process, and not result. Proponents of this view argue that where an arbitrator has 
committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration as contemplated by s145(2), 
it remains open for the award to be reviewed and set aside irrespective of the fact that the 
decision arrived at by the arbitrator survives the Sidumo test. I disagree. What is required is 
first to consider the gross irregularity that the arbitrator is said to have committed and then 
to apply the reasonableness test established by Sidumo. The gross irregularity is not a self-
standing ground insulted from or standing independent of the Sidumo test. That being the 
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case, it serves no purpose for the reviewing court t  consider and analyse every issue raised 
at the arbitration and regard a failure by the arbitrator to consider all or some of the issues 
albeit material as rendering the award liable to be set aside on the grounds of process-
related review.”256  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The SCA held that the basis for the LAC’s judgment is Ngcobo J’s gross irregularity dictum in 
Sidumo. This dictum appears to have been subsequently endorse  by the Constitutional Court in 
CUSA v Toa Ying where the court held as follows: 
“It is now axiomatic that a commissioner is required to apply his or her mind to the issues 
before him. One of the duties of a commissioner is to determine the material facts and then 
to apply the provisions of the LRA to those facts in answering the question whether the 
dismissal was for a fair reason. Commissioners who do not do so do not fairly adjudicate 
the issues and the resulting award will be unreasonble.”257 
 
There has been a lot of controversy with regard to the test for review since the judgment in 
Sidumo. It appears that the SCA has finally settled the debate. In summary, the SCA confirmed 
that the correct approach to reviews of statutory arbitr tions is as follows: 
The drafters of the LRA intended an extremely high standard for setting aside an award to 
support the overall aim of a speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes arbitrated by the 
CCMA. The general principle is that a ‘gross irregularity’ concerns the conduct of the 
proceedings rather than the merits of the decision. A qualification to that principle is that a ‘gross 
irregularity’ is committed where decision-makers misconceive the whole nature of the enquiry. 
On Sidumo’s approach, the reasoning of the arbitrator assumes less importance than it does on 
the LAC’s approach where a flaw in the reasoning results in the award being set aside. In the 
Sidumo test, the reasons are still considered to see whether the result can reasonably be reached 
by that route. If not, the court must still consider whether, apart from those reasons, the result is 
one a reasonable decision-maker could reach in light of t e issues and the evidence. The 
evidence must be scrutinised to determine whether the outcome was reasonable.  The Sidumo test 
will justify setting aside an award if the decision is ‘entirely disconnected with the evidence’ or 
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is ‘unsupported by any evidence’ and involves speculation by the commissioner. The review 
ground of reasonableness introduced by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo essentially provides 

























The aim of this research was to achieve four objectiv s namely: 
a) To outline the difference between reviews and appeals. 
b) To set out the grounds for review in terms of section 145 of the LRA. 
c) To outline how the courts have formulated and developed the test for review. 
d) To determine the role of reasonableness in the reviw of CCMA arbitration proceedings. 
e) To determine if the recent decision of the SCA in Herholdt has settled the debate 
revolving around the question whether section 145 provides for both a result-based and 
process-related review. 
 
A discussion of the difference between reviews and ppeals was undertaken. The courts have 
emphasized the importance of maintaining the distinctio  between a review and an appeal. An 
appeal court considers the material before the court of first instance to reach its own conclusion 
on that evidence. Reviews are to determine whether the arbitrator committed a gross irregularity 
in the conduct of the proceedings. There is a fine line between a review and an appeal and whilst 
it may be difficult to draw the line some times, the distinction must not be blurred.  
 
In terms of section 145 of the LRA a person may apply to the Labour Court to set aside an award 
of the CCMA on one or more grounds listed in that section. The grounds listed in section 145 
are: misconduct, gross irregularity in proceedings, excess of power, and improper obtaining of an 
award. Misconduct relates to immoral conduct such as bi s and extra-curial conduct such as 
improper relationship with a party outside of arbitration. Gross irregularities in the proceedings 
refer to the manner in which the proceedings were conducted. There are two types of 
irregularities: patent irregularities which take place openly and latent irregularities which take 
place inside the mind of the arbitrator. A latent irregularity would be a ground for review only if 
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the arbitrator undertaken the wrong enquiry or undertak n it in the wrong manner. If an arbitrator 
exceeds the powers set out in the LRA the award will be set aside. Awards have been set aside 
on account of commissioners having exceeded their powers by assuming jurisdiction where they 
had none. An award is improperly obtained if the party to the dispute obtains the award through 
bribery or fraud, or if the party to the dispute threatens a commissioner.  
 
Section 33(1) of the Constitution provides that administrative action should be lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair. In Sidumo the court held that CCMA arbitration proceedings constitute 
administrative action and therefore should comply with the Constitution. Arbitrators are obliged 
to make reasonable decisions, and the obligation to do so suffuses section 145 of the LRA.   
 
Since Sidumo the Labour Courts have made significant strides in interpreting and applying the 
Sidumo test and the grounds of review set out in section 145(2) of the LRA.  The legal position 
regarding reviews as illustrated by the case law cited above is that the grounds in section 145 of 
the LRA are not obliterated but are suffused by the Constitutional standard of reasonableness. 
CCMA arbitration awards may be reviewed on the grounds of review listed in section 145 of the 
LRA, and, in addition, on the ground of unreasonableness.  Before the recent decision of the 
SCA in Herholdt the position held by the Labour Courts was that there are two broad types of 
reviews, namely, result based reviews and process related reviews. This meant that there are two 
types of unreasonableness: substantive unreasonableness and dialectical unreasonableness. 
However, after the Labour Courts were accused of unduly relaxing the standard for review, the 
SCA in Herholdt ruled that holding that there are two types of unreasonableness would not be in 
line with the majority judgment in Sidumo. All courts are bound by the majority judgment. It 
confirmed the accusation that the Labour Courts have unduly relaxed the standard for 
challenging CCMA awards on review. It concluded therefore that there is only one type of 




The test for substantive unreasonableness is the Sidumo test, i.e whether the decision reached by 
the commissioner is one which a reasonable decision maker could not reach. The arbitrator must 
have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result. Where a 
commissioner fails to apply his mind to materially relevant facts or considerations, this is not by 
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